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Note 
 
Turning Winners into Losers: Ponzi Scheme 
Avoidance Law and the Inequity of Clawbacks 
Karen E. Nelson∗ 
On June 29, 2008, a federal district judge sentenced the 
man who had committed the most extensive and destructive 
Ponzi scheme in history to 150 years in prison.1 Bernard L. 
Madoff defrauded investors of up to $64.8 billion2 in a decades-
long scheme3 in which supposed profits came not from the mar-
ket, but from subsequent investors.4 When new investors ran 
out, these “profits” dried up and the fraud was exposed.5 At 
Madoff ’s final sentencing hearing, devastated investors lined 
up to tell their stories of savings lost and dreams destroyed.6 
For some of these investors, however, the financial ruin may be 
just beginning. Under federal and state fraudulent transfer law 
and traditional Ponzi scheme jurisprudence, the appointed 
trustee in a bankruptcy may “clawback” returns conveyed to 
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 1. E.g., Diana B. Henriques, Madoff, Apologizing, Is Given 150 Years, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2009, at A1, available at 2009 WLNR 12446925. 
 2. Martha Graybow, Madoff Mysteries Remain as He Nears Guilty Plea, 
REUTERS, Mar. 11, 2009, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/03/ 
11/us-madoff-idUSTRE52A5JK20090311. 
 3. See Robert Frank, Madoff Jailed After Admitting Epic Scam, WALL 
ST. J., Mar. 13, 2009, at A1, available at 2009 WLNR 4866802 (noting that 
prosecutors believe Madoff ’ s fraud began in the 1980s).  
 4. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1278 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “Ponzi 
scheme”). 
 5. Id.  
 6. See Henriques, supra note 1.  
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certain investors prior to the fraud’s exposure.7 Investors vul-
nerable to this process, often called “winners” because they re-
ceived an amount larger than their principal balance from the 
scheme,8 likely lost their balances left with Madoff as did “los-
ers” who made no profit from the scheme.9 However, trustees 
may also require that winners pay back any interest extracted 
from their accounts from up to six years prior to discovery of 
the fraud.10 This power is allowed whether or not such inves-
tors still have funds to pay, and despite their lack of culpabili-
ty.11  
The magnitude of Madoff ’s scandal highlights the major 
equitable dilemmas arising from the clawback aspect of Ponzi 
scheme avoidance law. Fraudulent transfer laws impose strict 
liability on initial transferees of fraudulent transfers,12 which 
has long been deemed unfair and punitive to innocent recip-
ients of such transfers.13 Jurisprudence specific to Ponzi 
schemes has exacerbated this inequity. Subjecting winning in-
vestors to clawbacks of their “fictitious profits”14 can impose in-
surmountable financial burdens on innocent victims of the 
fraud.15 Such a consequence encourages ethically questionable 
 
 7. See, e.g., Jeff Benjamin, Madoff Investors May Face Clawbacks, 
INVESTMENT NEWS, Feb. 10, 2009, http://www.investmentnews.com/article2009 
0210/REG/902109979.  
 8. See, e.g., Josh Nathan-Kazis, Should Madoff’s Winners Give Back to 
Losers?, JEWISH DAILY FORWARD (Oct. 16, 2009), http://www.forward.com/ 
articles/116262/. 
 9. Id. 
 10. See Paul Hinton & Jan Larsen, Clawbacks from Madoff Investors: 
Questions of Economics, Equity, and Law, NERA ECON. CONSULTING, 1 (Apr. 
28, 2009), http://www.nera.com/extImage/PUB_Madoff_Investors_Clawbacks_ 
0409_final.pdf.  
 11. See, e.g., Bliese v. McCarn’s Allstate Fin., Inc. (In re McCarn’s Allstate 
Fin., Inc.), 326 B.R. 843, 852 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2005).  
 12. 11 U.S.C. § 550(a)(1) (2006); UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT 
§ 8(b)(1), 7A U.L.A. pt. II, at 179 (2006).  
 13. See, e.g., In re McCarn’s Allstate, 326 B.R. at 852 (noting that “unfair-
ness in result” is not a defense to § 550’s initial transferee provisions); First 
Commercial Mortg. Co. v. Circuit Alliance, Inc. (In re Circuit Alliance, Inc.), 
228 B.R. 225, 233 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1998) (arguing that prohibiting exceptions 
to § 550’s “unqualified” language leads to “basic fairness” and equity issues); 
Craig H. Averch, Protection of the “Innocent” Initial Transferee of an Avoidable 
Transfer: An Application of the Plain Meaning Rule Requiring Use of Judicial 
Discretion, 11 BANKR. DEV. J. 595, 623 (1995).  
 14. In re Bayou Grp., LLC, 372 B.R. 661, 663 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007).  
 15. See, e.g., Alex Berenson, Even Winners May Lose Out with Madoff, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2008, at A1, available at 2008 WLNR 24370521. 
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attorney advice,16 causes conflict among victims,17 and strays 
from America’s fundamental tenets of capitalism. Further, 
Ponzi scheme avoidance law causes economic inequities among 
victims despite purporting to seek equality.18 Due to these ram-
ifications, many analysts foresee years of protracted litigation 
related to clawbacks in Ponzi scheme cases.19  
This Note argues that Ponzi scheme avoidance law must be 
aligned with a more equitable outcome for so-called winning 
investors. Part I outlines the federal and state fraudulent 
transfer laws relevant to Ponzi schemes, and the way courts 
have interpreted and applied these laws to winning Ponzi 
scheme investors. Part II analyzes the legal, personal, social, 
and economic inequities that arise from this application. Part 
III recommends that courts update their definition of “value” 
under Ponzi scheme avoidance law to allow for a more expan-
sive and economically equitable defense for winning investors. 
Specifically, investors should be able to retain the time value of 
their initial investment and a certain degree of opportunity 
costs. This Note concludes that treating victimized investors 
more uniformly in Ponzi scheme cases will better serve the 
fundamental equitable purpose of fraudulent transfer law.  
I.  FRAUDULENT TRANSFER AND PONZI SCHEME LAW 
IN THE UNITED STATES   
The body of law applicable to Ponzi schemes is a mixture of 
both state and federal statutes and court jurisprudence devel-
oped over time.20 Understanding the current state of this law—
referred to as “Ponzi scheme avoidance law” for purposes of this 
Note—requires an overview of the background and growth of 
federal and state fraudulent transfer law, as well as court-
made Ponzi scheme law. 
 
 16. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 108-40, pt. 1, at 593–97 (2003) (admonishing 
the “notorious ‘financial planning’ strategy” that utilizes Bankruptcy Code 
§ 522’s exemption rules); Asher Rubinstein, Madoff Jailed, What’s Next? Pro-
tecting Assets from Clawbacks, RUBINSTEIN & RUBINSTEIN, LLP (Mar. 18, 
2009), http://www.assetlawyer.com/wordpress/?p=149 (counseling liable clients 
to redirect assets into, among other things, exempt homes).  
 17. See, e.g., Nathan-Kazis, supra note 8.  
 18. See, e.g., Cunningham v. Brown, 265 U.S. 1, 13 (1924) (“[E]quity . . . is 
the spirit of the bankrupt law.”).  
 19. E.g., Benjamin, supra note 7.  
 20. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 546–550 (2006); N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. LAW 
§§ 270–281 (McKinney 2009); Bear, Stearns Sec. Corp. v. Manhattan Inv. 
Fund Ltd. (In re Manhattan Inv. Fund Ltd.), 397 B.R. 1, 8 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
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A. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER LAW 
Both state and federal fraudulent transfer laws apply in 
the context of a Ponzi scheme allegation. This section outlines 
the fundamental parts of each body of law that affect the out-
come for victimized Ponzi scheme investors.  
1. Federal Fraudulent Transfer Law—The Bankruptcy Code 
The U.S. Constitution vests Congress with the power to es-
tablish federal bankruptcy laws,21 and the Bankruptcy Reform 
Act of 1978 (the Bankruptcy Code or the Code) is the law gov-
erning bankruptcy in the United States today.22 The current 
federal structure consists of a united jurisdictional arrange-
ment of courts and judges that solely hear and determine bank-
ruptcy-related matters.23 Under the U.S. Trustee System, a 
third party is injected into bankruptcy litigation in certain cir-
cumstances24 to oversee the “administrative and supervisory” 
issues in bankruptcy cases.25 Understanding the unique bank-
ruptcy litigation process is integral to a thorough appreciation 
of the issues related to fraudulent transfers that can arise in 
these proceedings.  
One of a trustee’s key duties in a bankruptcy proceeding is 
to recapture the value of any fraudulent or preferential trans-
fers for the bankruptcy estate.26 Hence, the Bankruptcy Code 
gives trustees “avoiding powers” to void certain transfers the 
bankrupt entity (the debtor) made to the transferee before the 
debtor went bankrupt.27 Code § 548 details the situation under 
which trustees may avoid conveyances due to fraud.28 Specifi-
cally, trustees may recapture the value of any transfer made 
within two years of the bankruptcy petition filing and with “ac-
tual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any entity to which the 
 
 21. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.  
 22. See Charles Jordan Tabb, The History of the Bankruptcy Laws in the 
United States, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 5, 32 (1995).  
 23. Id. at 34.  
 24. See 11 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (“[T]he court shall order the appointment of a 
trustee (1) for cause, including fraud, dishonesty . . . [or] (2) if such appointment 
is in the interests of creditors . . . and other interests of the estate . . . .”); see 
also Hank Shafran, The Appointment of a Trustee in a Chapter 11 Case, INT’L 
L. OFF. (Aug. 29, 2003), http://www.internationallawoffice.com/newsletters/ 
detail.aspx?g=7db3c6f5-de0b-43d2-b027-c8d7cfc2da15&redir=1.  
 25. Tabb, supra note 22, at 40.  
 26. Id. at 26.  
 27. 11 U.S.C. § 546.  
 28. Id. § 548.  
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debtor was or became . . .indebted.”29 Trustees commonly avoid 
transfers in the Ponzi scheme context using this process, which 
has been aptly termed a “clawback.”30 
Section 548 does contain a defense for initial transferees of 
fraudulent payments that took in good faith and for value.31 
Such a transferee may retain his interest “to the extent that 
[he] . . . gave value to the debtor” in exchange for the transfer,32 
with “value” defined as “property, or satisfaction or securing of 
a present or antecedent debt of the debtor.”33 To the extent a 
transfer is not defensible and thus avoidable under § 548, how-
ever, § 550 subjects “initial transferees” to strict liability.34 This 
means trustees have an unconditional right to reclaim property 
from an initial transferee, regardless of the party’s good faith or 
consideration.35 Thus, where a fraudulent transfer is not de-
fensible under § 548—either not made in good faith or for val-
ue—trustees may avoid it. As a result of this defensive scheme, 
establishing the value exchanged in a fraudulent transaction 
becomes the pivotal task in determining how much money in-
nocent Ponzi scheme investors may be able to shield against 
the trustees’ avoidance powers.  
2. State Fraudulent Transfer Laws 
Separate from the federal Bankruptcy Code, laws render-
ing fraudulent transfers void have been part of individual 
American jurisdictions dating back to the English Statute of 13 
Elizabeth from 1571.36 Today, the Uniform Fraudulent Trans-
fer Act (UFTA) is the most prevalent state statute regarding 
 
 29. Id. § 548(a)(1). 
 30. See, e.g., Hinton & Larsen, supra note 10, at 2.  
 31. 11 U.S.C. § 548(c); see also Wilcek v. H. King & Assocs. (In re H. King 
& Assocs.), 295 B.R. 246, 286 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2003) (noting that § 548(c) is 
the only defense available for initial transferees of fraudulent transfers). 
 32. 11 U.S.C. § 548(c). 
 33. Id. § 548(d)(2)(A).  
 34. Id. § 550(a)(1) (“[T]he trustee may recover . . . from . . . the initial 
transferee of such transfer . . . .”); see also Hank Shafran, Limitation of Liabil-
ity of Subsequent Transferees, INT’L L. OFF. (Dec. 10, 2004), http://www 
.internationallawoffice.com/newsletters/detail.aspx?g=d883ae85-4a7f-4afc-9e15 
-71246570d003&redir=1. 
 35. See Shafran, supra note 34; see also Atlanta Motor Speedway, Inc. v. Se. 
Hotel Props. Ltd. (In re Se. Hotel Props. Ltd.), 99 F.3d 151, 154 (4th Cir. 1996).  
 36. UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT Prefatory Note, 7A U.L.A. pt. II, at 
4 (2006); see also Langdon Owen, The Basics of the Uniform Fraudulent Trans-
fer Act, INFORM LEGAL (June 5, 2008), http://www.informlegal.com/articles/ 
view.php?article_id=618.  
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fraudulent transfers, with forty-three states and the District of 
Columbia having adopted some version of the Act.37 Such pre-
dominance makes the UFTA an important component in the 
fraudulent transfer law relating to Ponzi schemes.  
The scope of the state UFTA extends beyond the realm of 
bankruptcy,38 its general purpose being to protect creditors any 
time their debtors—including Ponzi schemers—attempt to 
transfer or conceal assets that should be available to satisfy ob-
ligations.39 The act comprises twelve sections that set forth 
rules establishing when a transfer has been made, when a 
transfer is deemed fraudulent as to both present and future 
creditors, and what remedies creditors have available against 
the debtor and its transferees.40 The UFTA recommends that a 
cause of action be extinguished four years after the transfer 
was made, but allows a longer limitation period if the transfer 
was not and could not yet have been reasonably discovered.41 It 
also contains defenses available for transferees who took “in 
good faith and for a reasonably equivalent value.”42 These 
transferees retain an interest in the transferred property “to 
the extent of the value given the debtor” for the transaction,43 
analogous to the Bankruptcy Code. Due to the UFTA’s preva-
lence, this state law applies to investors in a Ponzi scheme pro-
ceeding in most circumstances.  
Importantly, however—particularly for statutes of limita-
tion purposes—not all states have adopted the UFTA.44 For ex-
ample, Maryland’s fraudulent transfer law is still based upon 
the now withdrawn Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act 
 
 37. Legislative Fact Sheet on the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, 
UNIFORM L. COMMISSIONERS, http://www.nccusl.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx? 
title=Fraudulent%20Transfer%20Act (last visited Mar. 3, 2011) (listing the 
states that have adopted the UFTA).  
 38. See, e.g., Kenneth C. Kettering, The Pennsylvania Uniform Fraudu-
lent Transfer Act, 65 PA. B. ASS’N Q. 67, 81 (1994).  
 39. Why States Should Adopt the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, 
UNIFORM L. COMMISSIONERS, http://www.nccusl.org/Narrative.aspx?title=Why% 
20States%20Should%20Adopt%20UFTA (last visited Mar. 3, 2011).  
 40. UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT §§ 4–7.  
 41. Id. § 9(a).  
 42. Id. § 8(a).  
 43. Id. § 8(d). Value is again defined as property or the securing or satisfy-
ing of an antecedent debt. Id. § 3(a).  
 44. Legislative Fact Sheet on the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, supra 
note 37.  
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(UFCA).45 Under the UFCA, individual state statutes of limita-
tion apply, rather than a separate and specific extinguishment 
provision as under the UFTA.46 New York also has its own 
state statute, the New York Debtor and Creditor Law (DCL).47 
This, too, has a separate statute of limitations, which allows 
avoidance of fraudulent transfers made up to six years prior to 
commencement of the suit or potentially earlier if the fraud 
was not immediately discovered.48 A transferee’s defense 
against avoidance is also somewhat different under the DCL, 
resting upon an exchange of “fair consideration without know-
ledge of the fraud at the time of the purchase.”49 These distinc-
tions become important when the trustee begins combining and 
applying state and federal law to individual Ponzi scheme in-
vestors.  
3. The Relationship Between Federal and State Bankruptcy 
Law 
For the potentially susceptible transferee in a bankruptcy 
action involving fraudulent conveyances, the multitude of state 
and federal laws can seem overwhelming. However, lawmakers 
have worked hard to maintain consistency and accommodation 
between the laws.50 Importantly for Ponzi scheme avoidance 
 
 45. MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 15-214, (West 2010) (Historical and Stat-
utory Notes). 
 46. See, e.g., United States v. Bacon, 82 F.3d 822, 823 (9th Cir. 1996) (ob-
serving this difference between the UFTA and UFCA); Freitag v. McGhie, 947 
P.2d 1186, 1189 (Wash. 1997). Some states have chosen not to enact this section 
of the UFTA (e.g., Minnesota), while other states have changed the recommend-
ed four-year period to six (e.g., Maine). UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 9.  
 47. N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. LAW §§ 270–281 (McKinney 2009).  
 48. See Aaron v. Mattikow, 225 F.R.D. 407, 413 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (“A claim 
pursuant to [s]ection 276 must be brought within six years of the fraud or con-
veyance, or within two years of discovery, whichever period is longer.”); Nat’l 
Westminster Bank, U.S.A. v. Frank Santora Equip. Corp. (In re Frank Santora 
Equip. Corp.), 256 B.R. 354, 372 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2000) (“Under the DCL, a 
creditor is permitted to trace a transferor’s transactions back over six years.”).  
 49. N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. LAW § 278. According to the Uniform Law Commis-
sion, the phrase “fair consideration” encompasses an element of good faith, while 
“reasonably equivalent value” does not. Summary of the Uniform Fraudulent 
Transfer Act, UNIFORM L. COMMISSIONERS, http://www.nccusl.org/ActSummary 
.aspx?title=Fraudulent%20Transfer%20Act (last visited Mar. 3, 2011).  
 50. See UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT Prefatory Note; Summary of 
the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, supra note 49 (noting that one factor in 
the Uniform Law Commission’s decision to promulgate the 1984 UFTA was 
that some of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code provisions on fraudulent transfers 
“reduc[ed] the correspondence” between the UFCA and federal law). Many of 
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law, § 548 of the Bankruptcy Code and UFTA section 4 agree 
on the main categories of fraudulent conveyances, one of which 
includes transfers “made . . . with actual intent to hinder, de-
lay, or defraud.”51 Thus, any debtor found to have made a 
transfer falling within this definition is similarly liable under 
both federal and state laws, and the transferee of that con-
veyance is vulnerable as well.  
The Bankruptcy Code and state fraudulent transfer laws 
also work directly together. The link allowing for this coopera-
tion is Code § 544(b)(1),52 which gives trustees “an extraordi-
nary power to step into the shoes of unsecured creditors . . . and 
avoid any transfer of a debtor’s interest in property that is 
voidable under [the applicable] state law.”53 The most impor-
tant benefit this power provides is a longer limitations period 
during which trustees may avoid transfers. For example, in 
New York bankruptcy proceedings, a trustee is not barred by 
the Code § 546’s two-year statute of limitations, but rather a 
six-year state statute.54 In a state that has adopted all sections 
of the UFTA, the period would be four years.55 The ramification 
of these alternate limitations periods in a Ponzi scheme scenar-
io should be clear: trustees will usually attempt to apply the 
longest period possible.56  
Ultimately, the combination of federal and state fraudulent 
transfer laws makes any property a transferee received from a 
debtor during a certain period of time vulnerable to avoidance, 
or clawback, if the transfer is deemed fraudulent. Under vir-
 
the UFTA’s Official Comments reference corresponding Bankruptcy Code sec-
tions. See, e.g., UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 5 cmt. 3; id. § 6 cmt. 1.  
 51. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(A) (2006); UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT 
§ 4(a)(1).  
 52. 11 U.S.C. § 544(b)(1). 
 53. In re Frank Santora, 256 B.R. at 372. See generally 8A C.J.S. Bank-
ruptcy § 696 (2009) (“Under certain conditions, state fraudulent-transfer law 
may be utilized by the trustee . . . to avoid fraudulent transfers and obligations 
in bankruptcy.”); id. § 707 (“[T]he rights and powers of the trustee are meas-
ured by the applicable state or local law.”). “Applicable state law” is also often 
called “nonbankruptcy” law. See, e.g., 3A BANKRUPTCY SERVICE LAWYERS 
EDITION § 31:272 (2010).  
 54. E.g., In re Frank Santora, 256 B.R. at 372; see also 3A BANKRUPTCY 
SERVICE LAWYERS EDITION, supra note 53, § 32:72.  
 55. UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 9; see also, e.g., Frost v. Contem-
porary Indus. Corp. (In re Contemporary Indus. Corp.), 296 B.R. 211, 216 
(Bankr. D. Neb. 2003).  
 56. See Management Alert: How Long and Strong Is Trustee Piccard’s 
Claw?, SEYFARTH SHAW LLP (Feb. 2009), http://www.seyfarth.com/dir_docs/ 
news_item/4eaabe32-919f-4867-8def-df4310518c05_documentupload.pdf. 
  
1464 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [95:1456 
 
tually all fraudulent transfer laws, transfers made with “actual 
intent to hinder, delay, or defraud” are fraudulent.57 And under 
state limitations periods, property transferred up to six years 
prior to the commencement of bankruptcy proceedings may be 
susceptible to avoidance unless the transferee can maintain an 
applicable defense.58 The key defense under both federal and 
state law is for a transferee to assert that he acted in good faith 
and received some type of equivalent value for his transfer.59 
Unfortunately, Ponzi scheme avoidance jurisprudence has 
made it hard for investors to maintain this defense.  
B. PONZI SCHEME LAW 
The term “Ponzi scheme” is named after Charles Ponzi, a 
man convicted of multiple fraudulent schemes in Boston in the 
1920s.60 A type of pyramid plot,61 Ponzi schemes involve appar-
ently legitimate investment entities.62 Rather than engaging in 
any underlying business or profit-producing activity for inves-
tors, the entity pays earlier investors a return using the funds 
of subsequent investors.63 Since this method of paying interest 
often generates falsely high returns, the scheme attracts fur-
ther investors,64 and the fraud continues until new investors 
dry up and the scheme disintegrates.65 The collapse of a Ponzi 
scheme results in a “pyramiding of the liabilities” to be dealt 
with in bankruptcy.66 Later investors, as well as those who 
reinvested their earnings over time, often lose not only the re-
turn on investment they thought they had made, but their en-
tire principal investments. Such investors may eventually end 
up in courts that have historically given Ponzi schemes special-
ized treatment under fraudulent transfer laws.  
 
 57. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(A) (2006); N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. LAW § 276 
(McKinney 2009); UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 4(a)(1). 
 58. E.g., Aaron v. Mattikow, 225 F.R.D. 407, 413 (E.D.N.Y. 2004).  
 59. 11 U.S.C. § 548(c); UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 8(a).  
 60. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 4.  
 61. See, e.g., Eberhard v. Marcu, 530 F.3d 122, 132 n.7 (2d Cir. 2008) (de-
scribing a Ponzi scheme as a type of pyramid scheme).  
 62. See, e.g., United States v. Moloney, 287 F.3d 236, 241–42 (2d Cir. 
2002) (providing an example of and a definition for a Ponzi scheme).  
 63. Id.; BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 4.  
 64. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 4.  
 65. See, e.g., Eberhard, 530 F.3d at 132 n.7.  
 66. United States v. Weiner, 988 F.2d 629, 631 (6th Cir. 1993).  
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1. The “Ponzi Scheme Presumption” 
The first principal ramification of an allegation that a debt-
or made transfers in the context of a Ponzi scheme is that 
courts apply the so-called Ponzi scheme presumption.67 This 
presumption holds that, as a matter of law, any transfers made 
by a debtor running a Ponzi scheme were executed with “intent 
to hinder, delay, or defraud” under federal and state fraudulent 
transfer laws.68 In other words, while the question of intent is 
normally a factual question for the court, courts automatically 
presume wrongful intent in the context of a Ponzi scheme.69 
The rationale behind this presumption is that a Ponzi scheme 
operator must be aware that its scheme will ultimately crum-
ble, and therefore that the later investors will eventually lose 
their money.70 As “knowledge to a substantial certainty consti-
tutes intent in the eyes of the law,”71 every payment out to the 
earlier investors had the purpose of defrauding the later ones.72 
The Ponzi scheme presumption ultimately makes it easier for 
bankruptcy trustees to avoid transfers made to investors by a 
debtor found to have been running a Ponzi scheme.73  
2. “Fictitious Profits” 
The second important ramification for Ponzi scheme inves-
tors—and the one that leads to the most extreme inequities 
under Ponzi scheme avoidance law—is the long-standing policy 
of courts to deem disbursements of “fictitious profits” to Ponzi 
 
 67. See, e.g., Bear, Stearns Sec. Corp. v. Gredd (In re Manhattan Inv. 
Fund Ltd.), 397 B.R. 1, 8 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007) (describing and applying the 
“Ponzi scheme presumption”).  
 68. See, e.g., Gredd v. Bear, Stearns Sec. Corp. (In re Manhattan Inv. 
Fund Ltd.), 310 B.R. 500, 506 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2002) (“Several cases hold that 
transfers made by a debtor operating a Ponzi scheme are presumed to have been 
made with the requisite fraudulent intent required by section 548(a)(1)(A).”).  
 69. Id. at 507.  
 70. Id. at 506–07 (quoting Merrill v. Abbott (In re Indep. Clearing House 
Co.), 77 B.R. 843, 860 (D. Utah 1987)). 
 71. In re Manhattan Inv. Fund Ltd., 310 B.R at 507 (quoting In re Indep. 
Clearing House Co., 77 B.R. at 860). 
 72. See In re Manhattan Inv. Fund Ltd., 397 B.R. at 8.  
 73. See id. at 10, 12 (noting that “consideration of the badges of fraud is 
unnecessary where a debtor was engaged in a Ponzi scheme,” and that “the 
Ponzi scheme presumption is an objective test” (quoting Sec. Investor Prot. 
Corp. v. Old Naples Sec., Inc. (In re Old Naples Sec., Inc.), 342 B.R. 310, 319 
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2006)) (citing Shapiro v. Wilgus, 287 U.S. 348, 354 (1932))).  
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scheme investors not made for reasonably equivalent value.74 
The term “fictitious profits” refers to any interest payments 
transferred to investors in excess of their principal investment 
in the venture.75 Since these payments are not deemed made 
for value, they are not defensible under the Bankruptcy Code or 
state fraudulent transfer law and are thus avoidable by the 
trustee.76  
The rationale for this rule stems from the definition of 
“value” in both federal and state fraudulent transfer law as in-
cluding satisfaction of an antecedent debt.77 An investor who 
entrusts money to an entity that eventually becomes a debtor 
in bankruptcy holds a valid claim against such debtor for the 
return of his original investment—the investor’s “principal un-
dertaking.”78 Interest payments above this amount in the Ponzi 
scheme context, however, are subject to a separate analysis. As 
they come not from the debtor’s legitimate earnings, but rather 
from funds that “rightfully belonged to other, defrauded under-
takers,”79 some courts have held an investor’s right to payment 
of supposedly earned interest unenforceable as against public 
policy.80 More importantly, though, most courts have held that 
 
 74. See Bayou Superfund, LLC v. WAM Long/Short Fund II, L.P. (In re 
Bayou Grp., LLC), 362 B.R. 624, 635–36 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007). Fictitious 
profits are also termed “false profits.” See, e.g., In re Carrozzella & Richardson, 
286 B.R. 480, 483 n.4 (D. Conn. 2002) (declining to use the term “false profits” 
but indicating its common usage). 
 75. See In re Bayou, 362 B.R. at 634–36.  
 76. See id. at 636 (“[V]irtually every court to address the question has 
held unflinchingly ‘that to the extent that investors have received payments in 
excess of the amounts they have invested, those payments are voidable as 
fraudulent transfers . . . .’” (quoting Soulé v. Alliot (In re Tiger Petroleum Co.), 
319 B.R. 225, 239 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 2004))); In re Indep. Clearing House, 77 
B.R. at 869 (“[P]ayments of fictitious profits to investors in a Ponzi scheme are 
not made for a reasonably equivalent value and thus are avoidable as fraudu-
lent conveyances.” (citation omitted)).  
 77. 11 U.S.C. § 548(d)(2)(A) (2006); UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT 
§ 3(a), 7A U.L.A. pt. II, at 47 (2006).  
 78. In re Indep. Clearing House, 77 B.R. at 857. Based on contract prin-
ciples, including restitution, the money owed is a legitimate debt within the 
definition of value under fraudulent transfer law, and investors have a right to 
retention of this amount as for value. Importantly, courts deem all amounts 
transferred to an investor less than the original investment return of principal 
regardless of the way in which the payments were designated by the parties. 
Id. at 857–58.  
 79. Id. at 858.  
 80. Id. These courts’ rationale is that enforcement would “further the 
debtors’ fraudulent scheme at the expense of [other investors],” and circum-
vent the “principle that no one should profit from a fraudulent scheme at the 
expense of others.” Id. at 858, 870.  
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the investor’s allowance of the debtor’s use of his money for the 
period of investment was not given for equivalent “value” under 
fraudulent transfer law.81 Courts have reached this conclusion 
because value is to be determined by an objective standard, and 
the only value the debtor receives through the use of investors’ 
money is the capability to continue its fraudulent scheme.82 
The value for this purpose is objectively “negative,” since it “ex-
acerbate[s] the harm to creditors by increasing the amount of 
claims while diminishing the debtor’s estate.”83 Thus, any in-
terest paid in return for a debtor’s use of its investor’s money is 
not considered transferred for value, and a bankruptcy trustee 
may reclaim it for the bankruptcy estate.84 
Sole contrary precedent to the fictitious-profits rule comes 
from a line of cases involving contractual rights to interest.85 
Two cases noted in In re Bayou—which investors seeking to re-
tain interest payments from a Ponzi scheme promoted as a de-
fense—involved transfers of contractual loan repayments86 and 
commission payments87 that were considered made for value.88 
One court has even held that interest payments to investors in 
a Ponzi scheme were made for value where the debtor promised 
a specific rate of return.89 Unfortunately, for most Ponzi 
scheme investors the fictitious-profits analysis remains the 
fundamental rule in cases lacking a specific contract. This 
leaves investors in schemes such as Madoff ’s with no defense 
 
 81. E.g., In re Carrozzella & Richardson, 286 B.R. 480, 488–89 (D. Conn. 
2002); In re Indep. Clearing House, 77 B.R. at 858.  
 82. E.g., In re Carrozzella, 286 B.R. at 488.  
 83. In re Indep. Clearing House, 77 B.R. at 859.  
 84. See Hinton & Larsen, supra note 10, at 4 (“[R]edemptions in excess of 
invested principal are ‘fictitious profits’ and thus, as a matter of law, not re-
deemed for value.”).  
 85. See Bayou Superfund, LLC v. WAM Long/Short Fund II, L.P. (In re 
Bayou Grp., LLC), 362 B.R. 624, 636–38 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007).  
 86. Id. at 636 (citing Sharp Int’l Corp. v. State St. Bank Trust Co. (In re 
Sharp Int’l Corp.), 403 F.3d 43, 47–48 (2d Cir. 2005)). 
 87. In re Bayou, 362 B.R. at 637 (citing Balaber-Strauss v. Sixty-Five 
Brokers (In re Churchill Mortg. Inv. Corp.), 256 B.R. 664, 679 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. 2000)).  
 88. In re Bayou, 362 B.R. at 638.  
 89. In re Carrozzella & Richardson, 286 B.R. 480, 489 (D. Conn. 2002) 
(“[P]ayment of interest to innocent investors pursuant to a contractual obliga-
tion clearly constitute[s] the satisfaction of an antecedent debt and, therefore, 
based upon the clear language of [the Bankruptcy Code], should be considered as 
the receipt of value by the debtor.” (citing Lustig v. Weisz & Assocs., Inc. (In re 
Unified Commercial Capital, Inc.), 260 B.R. 343, 350 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2001))).  
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against clawbacks of interest made beyond the amount of their 
principal investments.  
II.  THE INEQUITIES OF PONZI SCHEME AVOIDANCE 
LAW   
Investors who face clawbacks after a Ponzi scheme’s expo-
sure are among the foremost victims of the scheme.90 While in-
vestors who lose money during the scheme are clearly victims 
of the debtor and the fraud, investors who become clawback 
targets are arguably victims of both the defrauder and the 
fraudulent conveyance laws that permit this remedy.91 Fraudu-
lent conveyance law has built-in inequities, as well as the ca-
pability to spur a multitude of additional personal and social 
inequities in the Ponzi scheme context. Economic imbalances 
compound these injustices, turning winning investors into los-
ers in many respects.  
A. LEGAL, PERSONAL, AND SOCIAL INEQUITIES OF PONZI 
SCHEME AVOIDANCE LAW 
The legal, personal, and social inequities a clawback target 
faces stem from both the inherent inequity built into fraudulent 
transfer law as well as the law’s unjust effects. Ponzi scheme 
avoidance law is misapplied, causes social discord, and is in-
compatible with America’s economic ideological system.  
1. The Legal Inequity of Initial Transferee Liability 
First, there is a deeply ingrained equitable problem in ap-
plying § 550 of the Bankruptcy Code to any fraudulent transfer 
proceeding. In the fraudulent conveyance context, both courts 
 
 90. See Mark D. Sherrill, Limitations of Market Participants’ Protections 
Against Fraudulent-Conveyance Actions, AM. BANKR. INST. J., May 2009, at 28 
(“Investors are the most obvious victims of Ponzi schemes . . . whether they 
lose their investment or face a clawback after a successful redemption.”); 
Randy Krebs, Recipients of Petters Gifts Should Return Them, ST. CLOUD TIMES 
(Minn.), Dec. 20, 2009, at B16 (discussing the targets of clawbacks in a Ponzi 
scheme and noting that “[i]t’s as if the number of victims in this scam just 
grew again”).  
 91. See David Phelps, Returning Petters’ Gifts Easier Said Than Done, 
STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis, Minn.), Sept. 30, 2010, at A1, available at 2010 
WLNR 19706524 (quoting a Ponzi scheme bankruptcy trustee discussing 
clawback targets as saying, “I have investors who feel they’ve now been victim-
ized twice”); A New Fear for Madoff’s Victims: Clawback, NEO-NEOCON (Feb. 
26, 2009, 10:43 EST), http://neoneocon.com/2009/02/26/a-new-fear-for-madoffs 
-victims-clawback (opining that clawback targets “run the risk of being victim-
ized twice”). 
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and commentators have long recognized that inequities arise 
from application of the Bankruptcy Code’s strict transferee lia-
bility laws.92 Courts have criticized the “unfortunate” maxim 
that under the Bankruptcy Code, “neither innocence in action 
nor unfairness in result is a defense,”93 and opined that the law 
“leaves no room to fashion a remedy that treats the initial 
transferee equitably,”94 or to reach “what some may contend is 
a preferred result.”95 Scholars have made similar critiques, 
even arguing that in extreme circumstances courts circumvent 
the Code’s clear language to avoid inequitable ramifications.96 
One scholar’s solution posits that courts should be allowed to 
structure equitable resolutions in any case where the initial 
transferee no longer has possession of the transferred property, 
such as a transferee of a tort judgment who used the money to 
recuperate.97 A balance of social and equitable doctrines—
specifically the application of contract remedies like restitution 
defenses—should allow initial transferees to retain property in 
certain situations.98 Commentators agree with courts that the 
overall effects of the current Bankruptcy Code’s initial transfer-
ee provisions are wrongly unfair and punitive.99  
 
 92. 11 U.S.C. § 550(a)(1) (2006); see Shafran, supra note 34.  
 93. Bauman v. Bliese (In re McCarn’s Allstate Fin., Inc.), 326 B.R. 843, 
852 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2005) (quoting Perrino v. Salem, Inc. (In re Mainely 
Payroll, Inc.), 233 B.R. 591, 597 (Bankr. D. Me. 1999)).  
 94. In re McCarn’s Allstate Fin., Inc., 326 B.R. at 852 (quoting Bowers v. 
Atlanta Motor Speedway, Inc. (In re Se. Hotel Prop. Ltd.), 99 F.3d 151, 
157 (4th Cir. 1996)); see also Richardson v. FDIC (In re M. Blackburn Mitchell 
Inc.), 164 B.R. 117, 123 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1994) (remarking that there are sit-
uations in which it would be more equitable to allow an initial transferee to 
keep transferred property, but that courts may not “manipulate” the Code to 
reach this result).  
 95. In re M. Blackburn, 164 B.R. at 123; see also In re Se. Hotel Prop., 99 
F.3d at 157 (“[D]ecisions as to who should bear the loss incurred by a post-
petition transfer are made in the Code . . . . Whether the line which has been 
drawn is the best possible solution of the problem is not for the courts to say.” 
(quoting Lake v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 218 F.2d 349, 399 (4th Cir. 1955))).  
 96. Averch, supra note 13, at 602 (noting that notwithstanding the lan-
guage of 11 U.S.C. § 550(a)(1), some courts release an initial recipient of an 
avoidable payment from liability if the recipient was a “mere conduit”).  
 97. Id. at 602–03 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 550(a)(1) (arguing that 11 U.S.C. 
§ 550 already contains an equitable option in its language “if the court so or-
ders,” and that courts should be able to rely on this language to avoid inequit-
able holdings)).  
 98. Id.  
 99. Id. at 618–20; see also David F. Kurzawa II, Note, When Fair Consid-
eration Is Not Fair, 11 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 461, 475–76 (2002).  
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In the specific context of a Ponzi scheme, the law contains 
an additional legal inequity: a procedure that places the burden 
of the risk that a transfer may be avoidable on the initial trans-
feree.100 The rationale behind this rule has been enumerated by 
multiple courts holding that initial transferees are “in the best 
position to monitor the transaction,”101 “to know from whom 
they got funds, and to guard against fraud.”102 However, it is 
arguable that investors in a Ponzi scheme—particularly Ma-
doff ’s—would not fall into these categories. Madoff ’s prosecu-
tors allege his fraud began in the 1980s,103 meaning the scheme 
lasted decades. The longevity of his business would have served 
to assuage any suspicions an investor might have, not raise 
them. Further, federal agencies themselves admitted that Ma-
doff fooled not only investors but professional securities regula-
tors who had examined his business just one year prior to the 
fraud’s exposure.104 Individual investors relied on this informa-
tion to make investments.105 Thus, of all parties to be made lia-
ble under the Bankruptcy Code’s burden, most individual in-
vestors in a Ponzi scheme do not fit the rationale behind the 
rule. This misalliance exacerbates the legal inequity of Ponzi 
scheme avoidance law.  
2. The Personal and Social Inequity of Ponzi Scheme Investor 
Liability 
The justice of requiring so-called winners to pay losers in 
the aftermath of a Ponzi scheme is at the heart of the personal 
and social debate surrounding clawbacks of fictitious profits.106 
 
 100. See, e.g., Schafer v. Las Vegas Hilton Corp. (In re Video Depot, Ltd.), 
127 F.3d 1195, 1198 (9th Cir. 1997). 
 101. Id. 
 102. Bailey v. Hazen (In re Ogdon), 243 B.R. 104, 116 (B.A.P. 10th  
Cir. 2000). 
 103. Frank, supra note 3, at A1.  
 104. See Helen Kearney, Report: FINRA Missed Multiple Warning Signs in 
Madoff/Stanford Schemes, FIN. PLAN., Oct. 2, 2009, http://www.financial 
-planning.com/news/finra-mised-multiple-warnings-madoff-stanford-2664116-1 
.html; Were the Regulators and the Regulated Too Close?, ECON. TIMES (India), 
Dec. 17, 2008, http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international-business/ 
madoff-scandal-were-the-regulators-and-the-regulated-too-close/articleshow/385 
0103.cms.  
 105. See Thomas Zambito, Bernie Investors Burned for 13 Years, N.Y. 
DAILY NEWS, Feb. 21, 2009, at 6, available at 2009 WLNR 3423167.  
 106. See, e.g., Nathan-Kazis, supra note 8; Patrick M. O’Keefe et al., Ponzi 
Schemes in Bankruptcy, AM. BANKR. INST., 1–2 (July 2007), http://www.abiworld 
.org/committees/newsletters/CFTF/vol4num4/5.pdf. 
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“Winners” are defined as investors who made money during 
their time in the fraudulent fund, meaning they ultimately 
withdrew more money in profits than they had initially in-
vested.107 Since these investors are considered to have “come 
out ahead” in the context of the scheme, they may thus be bur-
dened with returning to the bankruptcy estate the difference 
between their initial investment and the money they ultimately 
withdrew from the fund.108 Apart from the law’s rationale that 
such fictitious profits were not received for value,109 the equita-
ble argument on the side of the law is that all investors should 
share equally in the harm from the fraud.110 In other words, in-
vestors who fortuitously escaped the worst of the fraud, and are 
thus presumed to have retained excess funds, should sacrifice 
for the benefit of the rest.  
While societal notions of fairness and kindness may seem 
to support such an argument, there are many key arguments 
that refute such a mode of thought. First, and most important, 
the designation of liable investors as “winners” can be severely 
inappropriate.111 Ponzi scheme avoidance law places victims 
deemed, or at-risk of being deemed, winners in a “precarious 
Catch 22.”112 Not only do they have a lesser chance of retrieving 
any funds left in their account through filing a claim with the 
Securities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC),113 they could 
actually make themselves worse off by alerting the trustee to 
their status as a winner and increasing the chances of a claw-
back claim.114 Despite this risk, many winning investors may 
 
 107. See Berenson, supra note 15, at A1.  
 108. Id.  
 109. See O’Keefe et al., supra note 106, at 2. 
 110. See, e.g., Poll: Should Madoff Winners Have to Share with Madoff Los-
ers?, CRAIN’S N.Y. BUS. (May 13, 2009), http://mycrains.crainsnewyork.com/ 
polls/2009/05/should-madoff-winners-have-to.php.  
 111. See Berenson, supra note 15, at A1. 
 112. See Rubinstein, supra note 16.  
 113. The SIPC, a securities industry fund whose purpose is to insure inves-
tors, has already denied insurance to many winning investors—over 2500 
people thus far. Brian Ross & Megan Chuchmach, Madoff ‘Losers’ Get Only 
$534 Million; ‘Winners’ Get Zero, ABC NEWS, Oct. 28, 2009, http://abcnews 
.go.com/Blotter/Madoff/madoff-victims-denied-claims-sipc/story?id=8936796; see 
also Lawrence R. Velvel, Re: Of Markopolos and Madoff, New Times and Con-
ventional Wisdom, SIPC and Clawbacks, Equitable Estoppel and Declaratory 
Judgments, VELVEL ON NAT’L AFFAIRS (Feb. 23, 2009, 11:22 AM) http:// 
velvelonnationalaffairs.blogspot.com/2009_02_01_archive.html (explaining why 
no SIPC recovery is likely). 
 114. See Madoff ‘Victims’ Do Math, Realize They Profited, BISMARK TRIB., 
Jan. 9, 2009, at A8, available at 2009 WLNR 476045; Henry Blodget, Madoff 
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truly need and deserve SIPC protection. As one commentator 
has noted, Madoff investors considered winners could include 
elderly people who depended on interest payments for their 
livelihood and now “don’t know where their next dollar will 
come from or how they will buy food.”115 One Madoff victim 
stated that most of the investors he knew who consistently took 
out interest were retirees living off of the returns from their 
principal investment.116 This group of victims also includes 
those who may have spent withdrawn funds to buy a home, pay 
for college for their grandchildren, or pay the taxes on what 
eventually proved to be “phantom income.”117 To protect them-
selves, these investors must spend even more money to engage 
the judicial process and represent themselves in court.118 Last-
ly, winners even include charities to which the debtor gave vol-
untary donations.119 Many investors—even the losers—find it 
morally reprehensible to take back funds given to charity re-
gardless of whether or not the charities ultimately profited.120 
This is especially true in the context of Madoff ’s scheme, since 
a majority of his charitable beneficiaries were Jewish focused, 
aiding the community of which so many Madoff investors are a 
part.121 Analyzing these so-called winners more closely reveals 
 
Winners Wonder Whether to Complain or Shut Up, BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 8, 2009), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/2009/1/madoff-winners-have-tough-decisions-to 
-make. 
 115. Velvel, supra note 113; see also Madoff Investors Continue to Seek Pro-
tection, REUTERS, May 27, 2009, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/ 
pressRelease/idUS121354+27-May-2009+PRN20090527 (“Today, many calls 
are from elderly people who have lost all or most of their money and are afraid 
that the trustee will take their home . . . .”). 
 116. Berenson, supra note 15, at A1.  
 117. Velvel, supra note 113.  
 118. See Kurzawa, supra note 99, at 476 (“[G]ood faith investors must ei-
ther engage in costly litigation or pay the trustee the interest paid to them.”); 
see also Zambito, supra note 105, at 6 (interviewing an investor appearing in 
court on behalf of her eighty-seven-year-old mother-in-law).  
 119. See, e.g., Josh Nathan-Kazis, Charities Hurt by Madoff May Have to Re-
turn Funds, JEWISH DAILY FORWARD (Aug. 19, 2009), http://www.forward 
.com/articles/112466/; Phelps, supra note 91, at A1 (quoting a Ponzi scheme 
bankruptcy trustee as saying, “[i]t hasn’t been a lot of fun . . . . I’ve had to sue 
charities”).  
 120. See Nathan-Kazis, supra note 8 (quoting one Madoff victim who felt 
charities should be able to keep the funds they received from the scheme be-
cause the money was used for “good works”).  
 121. Jocelyn Noveck, Madoff Scheme Hits Jewish Charities Hard, 
PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Dec. 17, 2008, at A9, available at 2008 WLNR 
24134165.  
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the error in such a classification and the problems such inves-
tors still face once the fraud is revealed.  
Further, despite the argument that Ponzi scheme avoid-
ance law is the communally fair solution, this law actually 
causes numerous undesirable societal consequences. The first 
of these consequences is questionable attorney advice. Ponzi 
scheme avoidance law places lawyers in a difficult position 
when counseling net winners,122 since lawyers know that the 
law ultimately requires those investors to return their fictitious 
profits. Such lawyers may end up advising investors to “[k]eep 
quiet and hope nobody notices,”123 or to convert vulnerable 
funds into exempt assets.124 This is exactly what bankruptcy 
law should and does desire to avoid,125 and even attorneys who 
would counsel their clients to pursue such tactics recognize that 
the law disapproves.126 Ponzi scheme avoidance law also pits 
victims of the fraud against one another. As losers become 
aware that the law authorizes clawbacks from winners for re-
distribution, it is only “a matter of time before investors wiped 
out in the scandal turn on those who unknowingly enjoyed the 
fruits of the fraud.”127 To at least one investor, the fact that this 
scenario occurs is devastating, and evades the real issue of se-
curing punishment for the truly guilty parties.128 Unfortunate-
ly, the law ultimately forces innocent victims to “claw at each 
other, whether they want to or not.”129 Such negative social side 
effects have real harmful impacts on all victims.  
Finally, the overall theory that winners must share with 
losers seems to contradict fundamental tenets of America’s val-
 
 122. See Madoff ‘Victims’ Do Math, Realize They Profited, supra note 114, 
at A8.  
 123. Id.  
 124. See Madoff Investors Continue to Seek Protection, supra note 115; Ru-
binstein, supra note 16 (counseling liable clients to redirect assets into every-
thing from foreign annuities and life insurance policies via offshore wire trans-
fers to a new home in Florida). Exempt assets can include retirement funds, 
certain types of insurance, and different levels of equity in a home. Id.  
 125. See H.R. REP. No. 108-40(I), at 595 (2003) (singling out as “notorious” 
the “‘financial planning’ strategy by which debtors purchase expensive homes” 
in order to qualify for exemptions under § 522 of the Bankruptcy Code).  
 126. See Rubinstein, supra note 16 (explaining that clients may need to 
prove that their new investments in exempt assets were “legitimate financial 
or estate planning,” otherwise they could be subject to clawbacks as made with 
“intent to hinder the trustee from reaching those assets”).  
 127. Madoff ‘Victims’ Do Math, Realize They Profited, supra note 114, at A8 
(quoting one attorney as saying, “[t]he sharks are all circling”).  
 128. Nathan-Kazis, supra note 8.  
 129. A New Fear for Madoff’s Victims: Clawback, supra note 91.  
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ued system of capitalism—a system that enabled Madoff inves-
tors to accumulate wealth in the first place.130 Much of the 
country reacted in uproar to a comment made by President 
Obama during his run for the White House in which he insin-
uated America would be better off if wealth were “redistrib-
uted.”131 The process of collection and redistribution in a Ponzi 
scheme bankruptcy sounds strikingly similar. While it is clear 
Madoff investors did not necessarily work hard for the profits 
they earned, the capitalist mentality serves to protect not only 
those who deserve their income, but also those lucky enough to 
accede to wealth without individual effort.132 As one commenta-
tor on clawbacks recognized, “We live in a world full of ran-
domness and risks that we can never fully anticipate or con-
trol.”133 A capitalist system embraces this risk for better or for 
worse, and the law should not serve to punish those who, due 
purely to fortuity, sold “at the right time” in the context of a 
Ponzi scheme of which they were unaware.134  
B. ECONOMIC INEQUITIES OF PONZI SCHEME AVOIDANCE LAW 
The specific economic inequities winners experience are 
just as harmful as the legal, individual, and social inequities 
stemming from Ponzi scheme avoidance law. The court’s rea-
soning in In re Independent Clearing House Co. is representa-
tive of the faulty economic rationale behind the current law’s 
allowance of clawbacks.135 Permitting the trustee to avoid pay-
ments of all fictitious profits in a Ponzi scheme, the Clearing 
 
 130. Kal Gullapalli, What Do Mortgages, Madoff, and Quiznos Have in 
Common?, BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 10, 2010, 4:40 PM), http://www.businessinsider 
.com/what-do-mortgages-madoff-and-quiznos-have-in-common-2011-1. 
 131. McCain, Palin Hint That Obama’s Policies Are “Socialist,” CNN.COM 
(Oct. 18, 2008, 5:48 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2008/POLITICS/10/18/campaign 
.wrap/index.html. Comparing this theory to socialism, many Americans made 
clear that they associate socialist ideology with legitimate wealth being taken 
away from some and given to others whom a third party—the government—
deems in need of it. See, e.g., Editorial, What ‘Socialism’ Means to the Masses, 
N.Y. TIMES: ROOM FOR DEBATE (Sept. 18, 2009, 8:41 PM), http://roomfordebate 
.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/09/18/what-socialism-means-to-the-masses/?scp=2&sq= 
redistribute%20the%20wealth%20obama%20socialist&st=cse. 
 132. The Danger of Madoff Style “Clawbacks,” JOHN STANDERFER (Apr. 27, 
2009), http://www.johnstanderfer.com/?p=45. 
 133. Id.  
 134. Id.; see also Should Madoff Winners Have to Share with Madoff Los-
ers?, supra note 110 (“Playing the market is like going to the races. You win 
some, you lose some.”).  
 135. Merrill v. Abbott (In re Indep. Clearing House Co.), 77 B.R. 843, 870 
(D. Utah 1987).  
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House court noted that “defendants are not hurt [by losing their 
fictitious profits] but will be in roughly the same position they 
were in before they entrusted their money to the debtors. They 
will still have all the funds that they invested . . . .”136 This 
viewpoint ignores fundamental economic principles by failing to 
recognize reliance interests, opportunity costs, and the time 
value of a winner’s initial investment.  
1. Real Losses: Reliance Damages 
As the court in In re Bayou Group, LLC noted, § 548 of the 
Bankruptcy Code is an equitable provision.137 Its purpose is to 
put winners in the same position as losers who did not receive 
payments of fictitious profits.138 Since equity is at the core of 
bankruptcy laws, equitable concepts such as the contractual 
doctrines of equitable estoppel and reliance damages139 should 
support and coincide with the outcome in Ponzi scheme avoid-
ance. Instead, however, such doctrines serve to illustrate the 
economic inequity of fraudulent transfer laws.  
The defense of equitable estoppel stems from principles of 
fraud, giving recourse to those who rely on and are injured due 
to fraudulent representations.140 A plaintiff who prevails with 
this defense may be awarded reliance damages.141 The theory 
behind reliance damages is that injured parties should be 
placed in the same economic positions they held before the 
fraudulent transaction.142 Courts thus award compensation for 
losses incurred in reliance on the fraudulent representations.143 
Reliance damages are recognized as “real” economic losses, as 
 
 136. Id.  
 137. In re Bayou Grp., LLC, 396 B.R. 810, 827 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2008), aff’d 
in part, rev’d in part, 439 B.R. 284, 303, 338–39 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).  
 138. Id. 
 139. See, e.g., Transcon. Realty Investors, Inc. v. John T. Lupton Trust, 286 
S.W.3d 635, 648 (Tex. App. 2009) (noting that reliance damages are available 
under valid promissory or equitable estoppel claims).  
 140. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 4, at 630 (defining “estoppel”).  
 141. Transcon. Realty, 286 S.W.3d at 648; see also CHARLES L. KNAPP ET 
AL., PROBLEMS IN CONTRACT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 968 (6th ed. 2007) 
(using Wartzman v. Hightower Products., Ltd., 456 A.2d 82 (Md. Ct. Spec. 
App. 1983), to explain “the injured party has a right to damages based upon 
his reliance interest”).  
 142. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 4, at 448 (defining “reliance 
damages”).  
 143. See Transcon. Realty, 286 S.W.3d at 648. 
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opposed to expectation damages.144 However, there are multiple 
ways in which Ponzi scheme avoidance law fails to recognize 
these real economic losses sustained by so-called winners.  
 The first relates to the most common type of reliance dam-
ages: out-of-pocket expenditures.145 Ponzi scheme avoidance 
law fails to recognize the additional out-of-pocket expenditures 
winners will likely have to make due to their reliance on the 
fraud. As a result of their status, winners are likely clawback 
targets, making them legally liable for money they may no 
longer have.146 In such a situation, winners must expend addi-
tional resources to either sell assets to recover the money they 
owe, or litigate the issue against the trustee.147 If an investor’s 
spent funds are irretrievable, he has no choice but to expend 
resources on legal representation. Thus, even if winners and 
losers eventually end up with the “same” amount—their prin-
cipal balance—winners’ economic positions may be worse due to 
additional out-of-pocket expenditures they were forced to make 
because of their reliance on fraudulent representations. These 
costs are legitimate reliance damages that Ponzi scheme avoid-
ance law does not recognize.  
Further, courts have held that reliance damages can also 
include foregone opportunities, or the “opportunity cost” of a 
transaction.148 One of the most obvious ways current laws take 
such costs into account is through awards of prejudgment in-
 
 144. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 4, at 448 (defining “reliance 
damages”). In the context of a Ponzi scheme, expectancy damages would give 
investors everything they would have received had the “contract” been upheld 
as portrayed. See id. at 446 (defining “expectation damages”). Thus, if this 
measure of damages were used, investors would receive the entire amount 
shown on any Madoff investor’s false statement, including fictitious profits.  
 145. See, e.g., Kreitzer v. Xethanol Corp., No. 08-14 (DSD/JJK), 2009 WL 
113373, at *4 (D. Minn. Jan. 16, 2009).  
 146. See Berenson, supra note 15, at A1. 
 147. For example, if a winner had bought a house with fictitious profits, he 
would have to incur additional costs to market and sell his dwelling in order to 
recoup the funds he owes. He may also lose money if the house declined in 
value from the time he purchased it.  
 148. See, e.g., Cole Energy Dev. Co. v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 913 F.2d 1194, 
1202–03 (7th Cir. 1990); KNAPP ET AL., supra note 141, at 974; 1 ROGER J. 
MAGNUSON, SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION § 2:32 (2010). Economists have also 
recognized this aspect of legal damages. See Kenneth L. Hubbell, Compensa-
tion for Pecuniary Losses in Breach of Contract Cases, 1 J. FORENSIC ECON. 27, 
32, 36 (1987) (finding that contract law damages are “consistent with economic 
theory” and “reflect[ ] the economic cost of the breach [of contract]” by taking 
into account opportunity costs). 
  
2011] CLAWBACKS 1477 
 
terest.149 As noted in Amara v. CIGNA Corp., one of the main 
purposes of prejudgment interest is to reimburse victims for 
true damages experienced.150 Although the specific rate may be 
determined in different ways,151 prejudgment interests’ under-
lying rationale is to compensate a plaintiff for being deprived of 
the use of the usurped funds.152 Thus, such an award is in es-
sence an opportunity-cost reliance damage award, and econo-
mists have specifically cited it as a legal argument that Ponzi 
scheme winners should use in attempting to protect some of 
their fictitious profits.153 Courts also award opportunity-cost re-
liance damages apart from prejudgment interest. In Medical 
Associates of Hamburg, P.C. v. Advest, Inc., for example, the 
court noted that in allowing recovery of actual damages, the 
applicable securities law meant to compensate plaintiffs for the 
“economic loss” resulting from the law’s violation.154 Conse-
quently, the plaintiff ’s damages were to be “market adjusted” 
to reflect that a properly managed investment would have kept 
up with the overall market.155 The court in Cole Energy Devel-
opment Co. v. Ingersoll-Rand Co. similarly allowed foregone 
opportunity damages in a breach of contract and fraud case, 
holding that the “economic concept of opportunity cost” is a 
method of adjusting value to reflect the fact that “for every use 
of one’s resources there is an alternative use, with its own re-
turn, foregone.”156 Courts clearly recognize that the opportunity 
 
 149. See, e.g., Amara v. CIGNA Corp., 559 F. Supp. 2d 192, 220 (D.  
Conn. 2008).  
 150. Id. 
 151. See, e.g., Saavedra v. Korean Air Lines Co., 93 F.3d 547, 555 (9th Cir. 
1996) (recommending the use of a “fluctuating rate”); Gamma-10 Plastics, Inc. 
v. Am. President Lines, Ltd., 839 F. Supp. 1359, 1362 (D. Minn. 1993) (pro-
moting the use of the rate “prevailing during the relevant period”), aff’d in 
part, rev’d in part, 32 F.3d 1244, 1257 (8th Cir. 1994). Rates may also be set by 
state or federal statute. See Hinton & Larsen, supra note 10, at 5.  
 152. Midwest Petroleum Co. v. Am. Petrofina Mktg., Inc., 644 F. Supp. 
1067, 1070 (E.D. Mo. 1986).  
 153. See Hinton & Larsen, supra note 10, at 5–6.  
 154. Medical Assocs. of Hamburg, P.C. v. Advest, Inc., No. CIV-85-837E, 
1989 WL 75142, at *1 (W.D.N.Y. July 5, 1989) (citing Osofsky v. Zipf, 645 F.2d 
107, 111 (2d Cir. 1981)).  
 155. Id.; see also MAGNUSON, supra note 148, § 2:32 n.51 (noting that 
“market adjustment” measures “loss of investment opportunity caused by the 
failure of the account to earn a rate of return based on suitable alternative in-
vestments during the same period of time”).  
 156. Cole Energy Dev. Co. v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 913 F.2d 1194, 1202–
03 (7th Cir. 1990) (citing Fishman v. Estate of Wirtz, 807 F.2d 520, 556 (7th 
Cir. 1986)).  
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costs of a fraudulent transaction are real reliance damages, and 
thus real economic losses.  
Ponzi scheme avoidance law, however, fails to account for 
the difference in foregone opportunity winners suffer as com-
pared to losers. Due to the nature of a Ponzi scheme, winners 
are often those who invested earlier in the fraud.157 This means 
they spent more time than many losers investing money in a 
venture that was relaying fictitious profits they later may have 
to repay. Since this is time during which those funds could 
have been invested in a legitimate security, such time 
represents an opportunity cost.158 In the hypothetical scenario 
of two investors—one who invested a principal amount six 
years ago and routinely extracted interest payments, and 
another who invested the same principal amount six months 
before the fraud was exposed—it is clear that the earlier inves-
tor suffers greater reliance damages in the form of foregone op-
portunities if forced to repay his interest due to a Ponzi 
scheme.159 And if the later investor is ultimately able to recoup 
the amount of his initial investment through SIPC protection 
and/or trustee distributions, fraudulent transfer law will have 
put the winning investor in a worse economic situation than 
the losing investor by ignoring the reality of opportunity 
costs—a valid component of reliance damages.  
2. The Time Value of Money 
In a similar vein, though perhaps even more extreme in its 
economic deviance, Ponzi scheme avoidance law completely ig-
nores the reality of money’s baseline “time value.”160 While to 
some extent an opportunity cost, the concept of the time value 
 
 157. See Merrill v. Abbott (In re Indep. Clearing House Co.), 77 B.R. 843, 
870 (D. Utah 1987) (“The fortuity that these defendants got into the scheme 
early enough to make a profit should not entitle them to a reward at the ex-
pense of equally innocent undertakers who entered the scheme later.”); 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 4 (stating in the definition of “Ponzi 
scheme” that “money contributed by later investors generates artificially high 
. . . returns for the original investors”).  
 158. Cole Energy Dev. Co., 913 F.2d at 1202–03. 
 159. If such an investor is deemed a “winner” and required to pay back fic-
titious profits, he loses up to six years of the rate of interest he could have le-
gally been earning on his principal balance, while the later investor loses only 
six months. 
 160. For a clear definition and explanation of the concept of money’s “time 
value,” see EUGENE F. BRIGHAM & PHILLIP R. DAVES, INTERMEDIATE 
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 28-1 to -10 (8th ed. 2007), available at http://www 
.swlearning.com/finance/brigham/ifm8e/ifm8e.html.  
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of money also includes recognition of the impact of inflation on 
the value of money and the availability of risk-free interest.161  
Time value’s inflationary element differs from the opportu-
nity cost of lost investment interest, since an interest calcula-
tion could include the foregone opportunity of investing in a 
higher return venture.162 Accounting for inflation instead rec-
ognizes the common financial understanding that if one’s mon-
ey is not keeping up with inflation, one is essentially losing 
money.163 The value of money is considered “preserved” by the 
fact that banks generally offer savings account interest rates 
that equal the inflation rate.164 The inflationary aspect of the 
time value of money impacts funds sitting in a savings account 
to the same extent as funds being invested in the marketplace, 
illustrating the concept that the purpose of inflation-related in-
terest is to maintain the value of one’s money—not to increase 
it. Even the Bankruptcy Code itself recognizes inflation and its 
impact on the “real value” of amounts it uses in parts of the 
Code.165 This recognition makes Ponzi scheme avoidance laws’ 
ignorance of inflation even more anomalous.  
The rate of interest given on a “risk-free” investment also 
reflects the baseline time value of money. Instead of using stat-
utory judgment or opportunity cost interest rates, for example, 
a smaller time value rate could be computed by using the “risk-
free rate.”166 This rate reflects interest on an investment that is 
essentially risk free—for example, government-issued treasury 
securities whose default risk is negligible.167 Treasury Inflation 
Protected Securities get their “principal value” adjusted consis-
 
 161. Id. at 28-15 & n.13 (describing U.S. Treasury bonds, which are risk-
less investments that provide a real rate of return plus expected inflation).  
 162. See, e.g., Cole Energy Dev. Co., 913 F.2d at 1202–03 (equating “oppor-
tunity cost” with one’s “alternative use . . . foregone”).  
 163. See, e.g., Becky Barrow, Eight in 10 Savings Accounts Lose Cash: In-
flation Goes Up—But Banks Still Pay Interest Rates Just Above Zero, 
MAILONLINE (Nov. 18, 2009), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article1228676/ 
Nine-10-savings-accounts-pay-paltry-customers-losing-money.html; Sol Nasisi, 
Impact of Inflation on Savings Account Rates and Returns, BESTCASHCOW 
(Feb. 20, 2009), http://www.bestcashcow.com/savings_-_checking_-_cds/article/ 
sol_nasisi/impact-of-inflation-on-savings-account-rates-and-returns. 
 164. Inflation and Interest Rate, ECONOMY WATCH, http://www.economywatch 
.com/inflation/economy/interest-rates.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2011).  
 165. 11 U.S.C. § 104 (2006) (Historical and Statutory Notes) (requiring ad-
justment of dollar amounts in the Bankruptcy Code every three years for the 
“housekeeping function of maintaining the dollar amounts in the code at fairly 
constant real dollar levels” (emphasis added)).  
 166. See Hinton & Larsen, supra note 10, at 6.  
 167. Id.  
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tently based on the Consumer Price Index,168 reflecting the no-
tion that the actual initial value of an investment—not interest 
earned—changes due to inflation. Allowing winning investors 
to keep the risk-free rate of return on their investments would 
be a way of recognizing the value of “the duration of their in-
vestments, [] while depleting the potential pool of clawback 
funds to a lesser extent.”169 Whichever methods courts choose, 
however, it is clearly economically inequitable for winning in-
vestors to receive no acknowledgment of the time value of their 
money or the opportunity costs of their investment. 
III.  CORRECTING THE VALUATION OF “VALUE”   
The current state of Ponzi scheme avoidance law—
specifically, its allowance of clawbacks—results in an extensive 
array of legal, individual, social, and economic inequities. To 
avoid injustice, Ponzi scheme avoidance law must take into ac-
count the time value and opportunity costs associated with 
winning investors’ expenditures, and allow such investors to re-
tain a portion of these costs. Such an approach will cause less 
imbalance and friction among victimized investors, encourage 
proper legal advice, and comport more thoroughly with the 
United States’ capitalist system. It is also economically sound. 
Importantly, this solution does not require an overhaul of state 
or federal fraudulent transfer laws. Rather, courts can achieve 
a more expansive defense against clawbacks for winning inves-
tors by updating the way they define and determine value un-
der fraudulent transfer law.  
A. DEFINING VALUE 
Current jurisprudence holds that only an investor’s exact 
principal balance has been given for value under fraudulent 
transfer law.170 Courts must shift this definition to account for 
flexible interpretive rules and new legal distinctions. Doing so 
will allow courts to recognize winners’ opportunity costs and 
their money’s time value, and thus achieve a more equitable 
outcome under Ponzi scheme avoidance law. 
 
 168. Protecting Your Money with Inflation Adjusted Bonds, BIONOMIC FUEL, 
http://www.bionomicfuel.com/protecting-your-money-with-inflation-adjusted-bonds 
(last visited Mar. 3, 2011).  
 169. Hinton & Larsen, supra note 10, at 6.  
 170. Merrill v. Abbott (In re Indep. Clearing House Co.), 77 B.R. 843, 857 
(D. Utah 1987); Bayou Superfund, LLC v. WAM Long/Short Fund II, L.P. (In 
re Bayou Grp., LLC), 362 B.R. 624, 636 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007).  
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1. Integral Interpretive Rules 
Courts have specifically been given deference to determine 
the “scope and meaning” of value on a case-by-case basis.171 
Under Ponzi scheme avoidance law, however, courts use a strict 
interpretation that provides only a dollar-for-dollar defense for 
investors.172 Such an interpretation is far too narrow, and, un-
der already established jurisprudence, should be much more 
flexible. Courts have held that the standard to determine “for 
value” under Code § 548(c) is the same as the standard to de-
termine “reasonably equivalent value” as used elsewhere in 
§ 548 and in the UFTA.173 The principles for determining 
equivalent value in most contexts are much more expansive 
than current Ponzi scheme courts recognize. Most other courts 
assess the “totality of the circumstances,”174 and make deter-
minations of value on an individualized basis.175 Specifically, 
dollar-for-dollar equivalency is not required.176 Rather, courts 
consider three elements: the fair market value of the property 
the debtor received in exchange for the transfer, whether or not 
the transfer was an arm’s-length transaction, and whether the 
transferee acted in good faith.177 Courts compare the “value of 
 
 171. E.g., Hirsch v. Steinberg (In re Colonial Realty Co.), 226 B.R. 513, 523 
(Bankr. D. Conn. 1998) (quoting Cooper v. Ashley Commc’n, Inc. (In re Morris 
Commc’n NC, Inc.), 914 F.2d 458, 466 (4th Cir. 1990)).  
 172. Investors are protected up to the precise amount of their initial prin-
cipal investments, but no more. In re Indep. Clearing House, 77 B.R. at 869–70.  
 173. See Dobin v. Hill (In re Hill), 342 B.R. 183, 203 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2006) 
(holding that the standard for defining value under § 548(c) should be reason-
ably equivalent value); Satriale v. Key Bank USA (In re Burry), 309 B.R. 130, 
136 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2004); 3B BANKRUPTCY SERVICE LAWYERS EDITION, su-
pra note 53, § 34:470 (“Term ‘value,’ as used in the section of the Bankruptcy 
Code setting forth the good faith defense to transfer avoidance . . . means rea-
sonably equivalent value. 11 U.S.C.A. § 548(c).”).  
 174. E.g., Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Fedders N. Am. Inc. ex. 
rel. Debtors’ Estates v. Goldman Sachs Credit Partners (In re Fedders N. Am., 
Inc.), 405 B.R. 527, 547 (Bankr. D. Del. 2009). 
 175. E.g., Shafran, supra note 34.  
 176. See Greenspan v. Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP (In re Brobeck, 
Phleger & Harrison LLP), 408 B.R. 318, 341 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2009) (“Reasona-
ble equivalence does not require exact equality in value . . . .”); ASARCO, LLC 
v. Ams. Mining Corp., 404 B.R. 150, 172 (S.D. Tex. 2009) (“[C]ourts look to see 
if what debtor received was ‘in the range of a reasonable measure of the value 
of what the debtor transferred.’” (quoting Viscount Air Servs., Inc. v. Cole (In 
re Viscount Air Servs., Inc.), 232 B.R. 416, 434 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1998))).  
 177. In re Fedders N. Am. Inc., 405 B.R. at 547; Cardiello v. Casale (In re 
Phillips Grp., Inc.), 382 B.R. 876, 887 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2008). Many courts 
hold that fair market value is the most important element. See Brandt v. nVidia 
Corp. (In re 3dfx Interactive, Inc.), 389 B.R. 842, 863–64 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 
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what went out with the value of what was received,”178 but re-
main flexible in deciding the factual issue of whether or not a 
transfer was for reasonably equivalent value.179 Thus, to better 
position themselves to allow equitable remedies for winning in-
vestors, Ponzi scheme courts must update the way they define 
value to include these reasonable and more flexible rules.  
2. New Legal Distinctions 
Courts reviewing Ponzi scheme cases also continue to use 
outmoded legal determinations related to fraudulent transfer 
law. While these courts have historically deemed fictitious prof-
it transfers not “for value” because of their negative implica-
tions in furthering a fraudulent scheme, recent decisions have 
begun to shift from this viewpoint and to construe value more 
favorably to winning investors. Ponzi scheme courts must offi-
cially recognize these current trends in avoidance jurispru-
dence, which will allow them to fashion more equitable reme-
dies for winning investors.  
The first trend stems from In re Carrozzella & Richardson 
and a line of cases discussed therein.180 In Carrozzella, the 
court determined that contractual interest payments from a 
Ponzi scheme debtor to investors could be considered for value, 
and thus immune to avoidance.181 While contractual interest is 
not necessarily at issue in a situation such as Madoff ’s scheme, 
Carrozzella’s analysis included the broader issue of whether 
payments of fictitious profits should always be deemed as re-
ceived for “negative value”—the traditional Ponzi scheme 
avoidance law determination.182 The court held that such a tra-
ditional view was erroneous in many respects, most important-
ly in its interpretation of the statutory language itself. Pointing 
to the avoidance language of the UFTA that directs courts to 
examine what is received “in exchange for the transfer,”183 Car-
 
2008); Heritage Bank Tinley Park v. Steinberg (In re Grabill Corp.), 121 B.R. 
983, 994 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1990). 
 178. In re Grabill, 121 B.R. at 994.  
 179. See Shafran, supra note 34.  
 180. Daly v. Deptula (In re Carrozzella & Richardson), 286 B.R. 480, 487–
88 (D. Conn. 2002). 
 181. Id. at 492. 
 182. See In re Carrozzella, 286 B.R. at 488; Bayou Superfund, LLC v. WAM 
Long/Short Fund II, L.P. (In re Bayou Grp., LLC), 362 B.R. 624, 635 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
 183. UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 4(a)(2), 7A U.L.A. pt. II, at 58 
(2006). This language is almost identical to the language of 11 U.S.C. 
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rozzella held that looking at the negative value in payments as-
sisting the debtor’s Ponzi scheme would incorrectly focus on the 
“supposed significance or consequence of the . . . transaction in 
the context of the Debtor’s whole Ponzi scheme.”184 The purpose 
of fraudulent transfer law is to “right the wrong of a single 
transaction,”185 rather than to achieve “distributional equali-
ty.”186 Therefore, courts should focus only on one specific trans-
action in determining whether equivalent value was ex-
changed, not on an overarching scheme.187 Furthermore, 
Carrozzella’s holding is consistent with the fraudulent transfer 
rule that courts should examine what is exchanged at “the time 
of the transfer” to determine equivalent value.188 Ponzi scheme 
courts thus should no longer consider a transfer’s subsequent 
impact on the debtor’s total business, but instead use this al-
ternate statutory interpretation in analyzing whether a win-
ning investor gave value in return for his or her “interest” 
payments.  
The second trend in the legal construction of value that 
should be followed to benefit winning investors relates to a dif-
ference in the way the term is used in the statutes—that is, 
whether it is part of a cause of action or a defense. Sections 
548(a)(1)(B) of the Bankruptcy Code and 4(a)(2) of the UFTA 
authorize trustees to avoid any transfers in which the debtor 
obtained less than reasonably equivalent value.189 As the lan-
guage implies, and as courts have universally recognized, the 
value in this case is measured from the perspective of the debt-
or,190 not the perspective of the transferee.191 However, Bank-
 
§ 548(d)2)(A) (2006). In re Carrozzella, 286 B.R. at 489.  
 184. In re Carrozzella, 286 B.R. at 488 (quoting In re Churchill Mortg. Inv. 
Corp., 256 B.R. 664, 680 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2000)). 
 185. Id. at 489 n.19 (citing In re Unified Commercial Capital, Inc., 260 B.R. 
343, 352 n.10 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2001)). 
 186. Id.  
 187. Id. The court also noted that any analysis beyond a specific transac-
tion would be going beyond the “plain language” of the statutes, and 
“usurp[ing] the function of the legislature.” Id. at 491.  
 188. See, e.g., Greenspan v. Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP (In re Bro-
beck, Phleger & Harrison LLP), 408 B.R. 318, 341 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2009); Slone 
v. Lassiter (In re Grove-Merritt), 406 B.R. 778, 805 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2009). 
 189. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(B)(i) (2006); UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT 
§ 4(a)(2), 7A U.L.A. pt. II, at 58 (2006).  
 190. See, e.g., In re Hannover Corp., 310 F.3d 796, 802 (5th Cir. 2002) 
(“[T]he recognized test is whether the investment conferred an economic bene-
fit on the debtor.” (quoting In re Fairchild Aircraft Corp., 6 F.3d 1119 (5th Cir. 
1993))); In re Grove-Merritt, 406 B.R. at 805. 
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ruptcy Code § 548(c) is worded differently than § 548(a)(1)(B), 
and is analogous to the transferee defense under UFTA section 
8(d).192 The court in In re Hannover Corp. explained that as a 
defensive provision § 548(c) is meant to protect transferees 
from an “unfortunate selection of business partners.”193 Conse-
quently, analysis of equivalent value in this defense must be 
made from the standpoint of the transferee, not the transfer-
or.194 Ponzi scheme courts must heed this key distinction when 
determining whether an investor’s fictitious profits were trans-
ferred for value.  
At least one court has already combined both trends to 
hold against trustee avoidance powers in a Ponzi scheme case. 
In re Financial Federated Title & Trust, Inc. reiterated that 
courts cannot look at a transaction’s impact on the debtor’s 
business to determine value, since “by definition, a Ponzi 
scheme is driven further into insolvency with each transac-
tion.”195 Noting that only erroneous reasoning could result in 
every transaction with the debtor being avoided, the court held 
that the determination of value under § 548 must focus on the 
value of what is provided to the debtor, rather than value from 
the debtor’s standpoint.196 While more recent cases seem to 
have ignored these trends,197 the Madoff calamity has illu-
strated the depth of the inequities caused by outdated interpre-
tations of Ponzi scheme avoidance law. Courts must update 
their determination of value under fraudulent transfer law to 
allow retention for winners of some fictitious profits equal to 
the time value of their money and their opportunity costs.  
 
 191. See, e.g., In re Brobeck, 408 B.R. at 341 (citing Brandt v. nVidia Corp. 
(In re 3dfx Interactive, Inc.), 389 B.R. 842, 863 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2008)). 
 192. 11 U.S.C. § 548(c); UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 8(d) (allowing 
a good-faith transferee to retain interest in a transferred asset “to the extent 
of the value given the debtor for the transfer”).  
 193. In re Hannover Corp., 310 F.3d at 802 (“[T]he provision at § 548(c) 
. . . provides a means by which the unwitting trading partner can protect him-
self.”).  
 194. Id. (“The concern here, quite properly, is for the transferee’s side of the 
exchange, not the transferor’s gain.”); see also Dobin v. Hill (In re Hill), 342 
B.R. 183, 203 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2006) (“[T]he relevant inquiry is the value given 
by the transferee, rather than the value received by the debtor as would be ex-
amined under § 548(a)(1)(B)(I).”); Shafran, supra note 34.  
 195. Orlick v. Kozyak (In re Fin. Federated Title & Trust, Inc.), 309 F.3d 
1325, 1332 (11th Cir. 2002) (quoting Merrill v. Allen (In re Universal Clearing 
House Co.), 60 B.R. 985, 999 (Bankr. D. Utah 1986)). 
 196. Id.  
 197. E.g., Bayou Superfund, LLC v. WAM Long/Short Fund II, L.P. (In re 
Bayou Grp., LLC), 362 B.R. 624, 636 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007).  
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B. APPLYING VALUE 
Courts that update their definition of value using more ap-
propriate interpretive rules and new legal distinctions will be 
positioned to allow more equitable solutions in Ponzi scheme 
cases. These equitable solutions can and should take into ac-
count the time value and opportunity costs associated with 
winning investors’ investments.  
1. Time Value 
The time value of money is an economic reality courts must 
no longer ignore in determining whether a transfer was for 
value. It is consistently taken into account in determining the 
true value of one’s money at banks, in courts, and in the Bank-
ruptcy Code itself. It reflects the fundamental maxim that a 
dollar today is worth more than a dollar tomorrow,198 and thus 
that a debt owed today should be higher if not paid until tomor-
row. Under a more flexible and case-by-case interpretation of 
equivalent value, courts must consider the fact that dollar-for-
dollar value is not required, but fair market value is key. Since 
fair market value often includes future value based upon time 
value,199 courts should easily be able to rationalize accounting 
for time value in considering Ponzi scheme winners’ interest 
payments. 
Specifically, time value should be acknowledged in consid-
ering the rule that a Ponzi scheme debtor’s repayment of an in-
vestor’s principal balance is deemed for value as satisfaction of 
an antecedent debt. Current Ponzi scheme avoidance law would 
hold that a payment of $100 in ten years would satisfy fully a 
$100 debt today. Using time value principles, however, courts 
should recognize that if adjusted for inflation, the debt owed to 
the investor would have risen by a small percentage each year. 
Thus, where the debtor paid ten percent interest annually and 
inflation was two percent, the debtor must still pay another 
twelve percent after $100 in payments for the investor to break 
even. By taking into account the time value of the investor’s 
principal balance, courts will reach the correct amount the deb-
tor must pay to truly satisfy its antecedent debt to the investor 
 
 198. See, e.g., The Investor, Time Value of Money: Why Locking Money 
Away Earns a Better Return, MONEVATOR (Jan. 29, 2009), http://monevator 
.com/2009/01/29/time-value-of-money. 
 199. See Eugenie Bertus & Mark Bertus, Determining the Value of Human 
Factors in Web Design, in HANDBOOK OF HUMAN FACTORS IN WEB DESIGN 685 
(Robert W. Proctor & Kim-Phuong L. Vu eds., 2005).  
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under fraudulent transfer law. This amount should rightfully 
be considered for value, and thus retainable for winning inves-
tors.  
2. Opportunity Costs 
In analyzing payments the debtor made to an investor 
above an investor’s time-value-adjusted principal balance, a 
somewhat less mathematical approach must be taken. Rather 
than transferring satisfaction of an antecedent debt as above, 
the transferee in the situation of fictitious profits is necessarily 
transferring a different type of consideration. Correctly valuing 
the consideration to determine whether equivalent value was 
exchanged requires courts to recognize the two modern trends 
in Ponzi scheme law.  
First, courts must only examine the consideration given in 
the specific transaction. In the case of a payment of fictitious 
profits, the value of the consideration given to the investor is 
clear: payment of money. The consideration given in return for 
these payments is the investor’s continued allowance of the 
debtor’s use of her funds. That leaving one’s funds in a certain 
investment equates to valuable consideration is made clear by 
understanding that the fair market value of an asset is the 
“present value of its expected future payoffs,” which the “oppor-
tunity cost of capital” helps determine.200 It is likely that had 
the debtor not relayed money to the investor, she would have 
taken her money out of the fund and placed it in a different in-
vestment that would have compensated her for the choice to in-
vest with that fund instead. Thus, the value of money made 
available for investment has a true fair market value, deter-
minable by assessing an investor’s alternative investment op-
tions.201 This comports with the second trend in construction, 
which is that in determining the extent to which a transferee 
exchanged equivalent value under the Bankruptcy Code and 
the UFTA, value from the investor’s perspective should be 
used. Therefore, from the standpoint of the transferee investor, 
the measure of the value of her consideration must be her op-
portunity cost—the worth of the next-best alternative invest-
ment she forewent by leaving her money in the debtor’s hands.  
 
 200. Id. (noting that a key element in determining market value is an as-
set’s rate of return, also called its opportunity cost).  
 201. Id. (stating that investment opportunity costs in business are calcu-
lated by appraising alternative investments comparable in level of risk and 
possible return).  
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As discussed above, courts and scholars consider foregone 
opportunity to be an actual loss suffered. Ultimately then, re-
taining the value of one’s opportunity cost from a transaction 
should not be seen as a windfall to the transferee who received 
fictitious profits, but rather as a real part of the extent of value 
given in the specific transaction. In other words, for each pay-
ment of fictitious profits made to the transferee, the extent of 
the value given in return—and thus retainable under defenses 
in both Code § 548 and the UFTA—should be equal to the fair 
market value of the investor’s next-best alternative investment 
at the time of the transfer.  
C. DETERMINING VALUE 
The most challenging element of this solution is the actual 
valuation of opportunity costs and the time value of money. 
However, such an evaluation is not as complex as it may ap-
pear. In measuring the baseline time value of money adjusted 
solely for inflation, the Bankruptcy Code already provides a 
workable and approved solution: the Consumer Price Index 
(CPI).202 The CPI is a recognized method of determining infla-
tion,203 which the Bureau of Labor Statistics updates on a 
monthly basis.204 This measure could easily be applied to the 
amount of an investor’s principal balance over the time span 
during which she invested to determine the value of the pay-
ments for which the investor returned the consideration of sat-
isfaction of antecedent debt to the debtor under the Bankruptcy 
Code and the UFTA.  
Evaluating an investor’s opportunity cost is somewhat 
more difficult, but not impossible. The largest hurdle would 
seem to be the factual issue of proving, after the fact, which al-
ternative investment an investor would have made. Courts 
have consistently applied a more standardized approach to ac-
count for opportunity costs, however. Issuing prejudgment in-
terest awards to plaintiffs reflects compensation for the oppor-
tunity costs of the loss of use of their money, and is often a 
 
 202. See 11 U.S.C. § 104 (2006).  
 203. See generally WALTER LANE & MARY LYNN SCHMIDT, COMPARING U.S. 
AND EUROPEAN INFLATION: THE CPI AND THE HICP 20 (2006), available at 
http://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2006/05/art3full.pdf; U.S. Dept. of Labor, Con-
sumer Price Index: Frequently Asked Questions, BUREAU LAB. STAT., http://www 
.bls.gov/cpi/cpifaq.htm (last visited Mar. 3, 2011). 
 204. U.S. Dept. of Labor, Consumer Price Index:, Frequently Asked Ques-
tions, supra note 203.  
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fixed rate set by state or federal statute.205 Other courts have 
recommended using a “fluctuating rate,”206 or the rate “prevail-
ing during the relevant period.”207 In determining an equitable 
rate, courts may take into account the condition of the money 
market and the rate banks charge for the use of money.208 Most 
relevant to the situation of Ponzi scheme interest are the fac-
tors the court in Amara deemed to be overarching in determin-
ing a compensable rate: “(i) the need to fully compensate the 
wronged party for actual damages suffered, (ii) considerations 
of fairness and the relative equities of the award, (iii) the re-
medial purpose of the statute involved, and/or (iv) such other 
general principles as [the court deems] relevant.”209 
Amara’s four factors can be directly applied to determine 
the fair rate of interest a Ponzi scheme investor should get to 
keep to reflect the extent of the value of her consideration in a 
fictitious-profits payment transaction. Under the first factor, 
courts must consider an investor’s reliance damages, including 
opportunity costs and the next-best alternative to the sham in-
vestment. Under the second factor, however, courts can also 
consider the relative equities of both winning and losing inves-
tors, and take into account the bankruptcy estate’s benefit to 
losers in determining how much winning investors get to keep. 
As outlined above, fraudulent transfer laws have the goal of 
equity at their core, but not necessarily the goal of distribu-
tional equity among creditors.210 Courts should take this into 
account under the third factor. Finally, the fourth factor may 
include consideration of the specific circumstances of the inves-
tor, the scheme, or other equitable legal principles.  
It is important to note that equities may not result in in-
vestors getting to keep all of their fictitious profits. For exam-
ple, although the Madoff scheme’s payout was on the low end of 
the interest rates typically offered to investors in Ponzi 
 
 205. See, e.g., Hinton & Larsen, supra note 10, at 5.  
 206. Saavedra v. Korean Air Lines Co., 93 F.3d 547, 555 (9th Cir. 1996).  
 207. Gamma-10 Plastics, Inc. v. Am. President Lines, Ltd., 839 F. Supp. 
1359, 1362 (D. Minn. 1993) (also noting that determining this market rate is a 
“factual inquiry”). 
 208. E.g., Emp’r-Teamsters Joint Council No. 84 v. Weatherall Concrete, 
Inc., 468 F. Supp. 1167, 1171 (S.D.W.Va. 1979).  
 209. Amara v. CIGNA Corp., 559 F. Supp. 2d 192, 220 (D. Conn. 2008) (quot-
ing Jones v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 223 F.3d 130, 139 (2d Cir. 2000)).  
 210. See Daly v. Deptula (In re Carrozzella & Richardson), 286 B.R. 480, 
489 n.19 (D. Conn. 2002).  
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schemes,211 a court may consider the fact that most Ponzi 
schemes pay higher returns than those that could have been 
achieved in a legitimate market venture.212 Obviously, only le-
gal returns should be the benchmark by which courts compen-
sate investors in an opportunity-cost situation. Ultimately, 
however, courts must use their flexibility and fact-finding ca-
pabilities to reach the fairest solution based on all of the facts 
and circumstances. This is what both the law and society re-
quire of them.213 
  CONCLUSION   
Fraudulent transfer law has equity as its underlying goal. 
Particularly in bankruptcy, it attempts to achieve a balance be-
tween innocent creditors and third-party transferees. In the 
case of a Ponzi scheme—a scheme in which almost all investors 
are defrauded in some way or another—equity is even more vi-
tal. Ponzi scheme avoidance law, however, as both federal and 
state statutes and courts interpreting these statutes have 
created, has landed stiffly on the side of “losing” investors to 
the detriment of “winning” investors. While doing so in the 
name of equity, its consequence has been to create even more 
victims in the fallout of a Ponzi scheme by subjecting winners 
to clawbacks under both state and federal law. Finding true 
equity in the aftermath of a Ponzi scheme requires courts to 
recognize the personal and economic losses winners suffer as 
well as losers. By redefining the value required for a transfer-
ee’s good faith defense to include consideration of the funda-
mental legal and economic concepts of time value and opportu-
nity-cost reliance damages, courts can reach a more just 
solution for so-called winners in the wake of a Ponzi scheme. 
 
 211. Berenson, supra note 15, at A1.  
 212. Id.; see also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 4 (defining “Ponzi 
scheme”); Phelps, supra note 91, at A1 (quoting a Ponzi scheme trustee as ar-
guing that the Ponzi schemer “promised, and produced, returns that were too 
good to be true, reflecting a pattern of abnormally consistent and significant 
profitability that was not credible”).  
 213. See, e.g., Hinton & Larsen, supra note 10, at 7 (“[W]hether [statutes 
preclude] the application of interest adjustments to principal for the purpose 
of computing covered investor losses has no bearing on whether time value of 
money adjustments should be made to invested principal in the context of a 
‘good faith’ defense. The legal basis for making these adjustments is different 
in each case and there is no requirement for symmetric treatment.”). 
